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Abstract
The article examines the history of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Southeast Asia,
especially in Kuala Lumpur and Aceh. The author traces the historical
background of this religious movement with particular reference to the
birth place of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh, India. The author investigates the major
role of Indian in disseminating Islam in Southeast Asia, especially in
Malaysia and Indonesia. Many scholars believe that Islam came to
Southeast Asia from India (Gujarat), and this is the reason why many
Islamic traditions in this region were influenced by Indian culture. However,
to analyze Islamic movement in Southeast Asia one should take into
consideration the Middle East context in which various Islamic movements
flourished. Unlike many scholars who believe that the spirit of revivalism
or Islamic modernism in Southeast Asia was more influenced by Islam in
the Middle East than Indian, the author argues that the influence of
Indian Muslim in Southeast Asia cannot be neglected, particularly in the
case of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh.
–––––––––––––––––
*) This article is part of  my Ph.D. project on ‘From Islamic Revivalism to Islamic
Radicalism in Southeast Asia: A Study of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Malaysia and Indonesia.”
The early section of  it was also presented in Workshop on Islamic Culture(s), Nation
Building and the Media: Contemporary Issues, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
on 23-24 September 2006. I thank to Prof. Joel S. Kahn and Dr. Wendy Mee for their
valuable comments during preparation of this draft. Some of names that appear in this
piece are pseudonym.
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A. Introduction
Most Islamic movements in Southeast Asia in 1920s employed
socio-political power as means to revive Islam; it was very difficult to
find out any Islamic movement that utilized missionary and mystical
practice. Dekmejian,1 for example, excludes the role of Sufist movement
such as Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in his list of  Islamic fundamentalist movements
in the Muslim world, especially in Middle East and South Asia. He
prefers to focus on the emergence of radical Islamic movement by
looking at internal problems in Middle Eastern countries. Dekmejian
argues that there were many causes of Islamic revival among Muslim
community, including identity crises, legitimacy crises, elite misrule
and coercion, class conflict, and modernization.2 In fact, he does not
include the role of  Indian-Muslim as a source of  information to
understand the emergence of Islamic movement. Some scholars have
studied on South Asian Muslim pioneers such as Abu al-A’la al-
Maududi, a founder of  Jama>’at-i>-Isla>mi, an Islamic party in Pakistan,3
–––––––––––––––––
1 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World,
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985).
2 Ibid., pp. 35-6.
3 On history of this Islamic thinker, see Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad,
Relasi Islam dan Negara dalam Perspektif Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme, (Magelang:
Indonesia Tera, 2001); Abdul Rashid Moten, “Mawdu>di> and the Transformation of
Jama>’at-E-Isla>mi>,” The Muslim World ,Vol.93 (2003); Omar Khalidi, “Mawlana Mawdudi
and the Future Political Order in British India,” The Muslim World, Vol.93, No.3/4
(2003); M. Abdul Haq Ansari, “Mawdudi Contribution to Theology”, The Muslim
World, Vol.93, No.3/4 (2003); Fathi Osman, “Mawdudi’s Contribution to the
Development of  Modern Islamic Thingking in the Arab World”, The Muslim World,
Vol.93, No.3/4 (2003); Malik B. Badri, “A Tribute to Mawlana Mawdudi from an
Autobiographical Point of  View”, The Muslim World, Vol.93, No.3/4 (2003). For analysis
of  his party, see Anis Ahmad, “Mawdudi’s Concept of  Shariah”, The Muslim World,
Vol.94, No.3/4 (2003); Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam
Politik Islam: Perbandingan Partai Masyumi (Indonesia) dan Partai Jama>’at-I-Isla>mi> (Pakistan),
(Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999).
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and regarded as the most influential Islamic political thinker.4 Although
some scholars recognize that Indian Muslim did play an important role
in the region,5 the development of Islamic networks between South
Asia and Southeast Asia is nevertheless still neglected.6 Most studies
on Islamic networks focus on the links between Middle Eastern and
Southeast Asian Islam.7 At this point, I would like to argue that Indian-
Muslims have played an important role since the first coming of Islam
to Southeast Asia. The development of intellectual network can be
found in the links between ‘ulama>’ from India and Southeast Asia,
especially through mystical teaching propagated by a Gujarati scholar
Nurdi>n ar-Raniri, the great ‘ulama>’ of Aceh who had authored many
books in Southeast Asia. Ar-Raniri’s works are widely read8 and
commented in many Islamic boarding schools in the region.
–––––––––––––––––
4 Osman, “Mawdudi’s Contribution to the Development of  Modern Islamic
Thinking in the Arab World”, pp. 465-485.
5 Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, “Kontribusi Daerah Aceh Terhadap
Perkembangan Awal Hukum Islam Di Indonesia”, Al-Ja>mi’ah: Journal of  Islamic Studies
64 (1999); Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, Islam Historis: Dinamika Studi Islam di
Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2002).
6 Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism: Networks of Malay-Indonesian
and Middle Eastern ‘Ulama in the 17th and 18th Centuries (Hawaii: University of Hawaii
Press, 2004). The brief review on the work on Sufism in Indonesia to examine of the
Indian-Muslim, see Martin van Bruinessen, “The Origins and Development of Su>fi>
Orders (Tarekat) in Southeast Asia,” Studia Islamika, 1,1 (1994); Martin van Bruinessen,
“Studies of  Sufism and the Sufi Orders in Indonesia”, Die Welt des Islams 38, no. 1
(1998).
7 Michael Franciss Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma
Below the Winds (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Michael Franciss
Laffan, “An Indonesian Community in Cairo: Continuity and Change in a Cosmopolitan
Islamic Milieu,” Indonesia No.77 (2004); William Roff, The Origins of  Malay Nationalism
(New Have: Yale University Press., 1967); William Roff, “Indonesian and Malay Students
in Cairo in the 1920’s,” Indonesia 9 (1970), Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic
Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesian
Project, 1970); Howard M. Federspiel, Islam and Ideology in the Emerging Indonesian State:
The Persatuan Islam (Persis), 1923-1957 (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
8 Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas writes about this book as follow: ‘This
work in Malay was begun in 1643 and completed seven years. It deals with the science of
practical judgments pertaining to religious practice (al-fiqh), but treats only those aspects
concerned with devotional duties (al-‘ibadat).The part of dealing with those aspects
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Thus, Sufism contributed to the spread of Islam in Southeast
Asia.9 It can also be argued that Sufism could be a method to convert
people to Islam in early of  the coming of  Islam. Bruinessen10 writes:
“Islam as taught to the first Southeast Asian converts was probably
strongly colored by su>fi> doctrines and practices.” Historically the issue
of  Islamic Sufism has become a hot debate within Muslim communities.
In Aceh, for example, there was debate on Sufi teaching among Muslims
when Nurdi>n Ar-Raniri acted as the jurist consult (mufti>) during the
reign of  Sultan Iskandar Tsa>ni in the 16 Century.  However, the case
of Hamzah Fansu>ri who proposed the idea of wahdatul wuju>d (the Unity
of Being) was seen as the decline of Sufism activities in Aceh,11 even
though some Acehnese still practicing mystical life what is called sulu>k
or kalu>t.12 Thus, Sufism played a major role in the early Islamic history
of Southeast Asia.
B. The Emergence of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
The Jama>‘ah Tabli >gh movement was founded by Mawlana
Muhammad Ilya>s bin Muhammad Ismail al-Hanafi ad-Diyubandi al-
–––––––––––––––––
concerned with pratical duties (al-mua‘a>mala>t) was treated by ‘Abd al-Ra’ûf  al-Sinkili (d.
after 1693) in his Mir‘a>t al-Tulla>b. The Sira>t al-Mustaqi>m was printed in the margin of  the
Sabi>l al-Muhtadi>n of  Muhammad Arshad in Makkah in 1892.’ See Syed Muhammad
Naquib Al-Attas, A Commentary of  the Hujjat Al-Siddiq of  Nur Al-Din Al-Raniri (Kuala
Lumpur: Ministry of  Culture Malaysia, 1986), p. 25. Martin van Bruinessen says that
this book was printed many times in Egypt and Surabaya. This book is continuously
been used in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren,
and Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1999).
9 Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism.
10 Bruinessen, “The Origins and Development of  Su>fi> Orders”, p. 4.
11 Amirul Hadi, “Exploring the Life of  Hamzah Fansu>ri>,” Al-Ja>mi’ah: Journal of
Islamic Studies 41, 2 (2003).
12 Oman Fathurahman, Tanbi>h Al-Ma>syi> Menyoal Wahdatul Wujud: Kasus Abdurrauf
Singkel Di Aceh Abad 17 (Bandung: Mizan, 1999); Misri A. Muchsin, “Salik Buta Aliran
Tasawuf  Aceh Abad XX,” Al-Ja>mi’ah: Journal of  Islamic Studies 42,1 (2004). On this
spiritual journey, see Syaikh Najm al-Din Kubra, “Adab Al-Suluk: Sebuah Risalah tentang
Perjalanan Spiritual,” Al-Hikmah: Jurnal Studi-studi Islam, VI,15 (1995).
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008 M/1429 H 357
The History of  Jama >‘ah Tabli>gh in Southeast Asia
Jisti al-Kandahlawi (1885-1944); a Deabond-associated Sufi-scholar,13
in 1927 in Mewat, South of Delhi, India. Regarding the Deoband
scholars, Reetz writes: “it was meant to rectify the perceived lack of
religious education among the Muslim in British India as the religious
scholars feared a loss or weakening of Islamic identity in the wake of
the spread of  English language education and Western values.”14
Historically, Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was variously known as the ‘jama>’at’ (party),
‘tahri>k’ (movement), ‘niza>m’ (system), ‘tanzi>m’ (organization), ‘tabli>gh’
(dakwah), and ‘tahrik-i-ima>n (faith movement). According to Haq, this
movement “was known as Bhopali Jama>‘ah because after the death of
the founder its annual conventions were often held in Bhopal (now in
Madhya Pradesh). Ilya>s himself  liked to refer to the movement as Tahrik-
i-Ima>n or the Faith Movement.”15 He regards Muslims as a Jama>‘ah which
has already been formed, so Ilya>s did not consider that he was
establishing a new jama>‘ah (Islamic community).
This movement is aimed at reforming individual’s behavior to
develop an ideal Muslim society in line with the teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad.16 Ali states that: “Its function is to encourage the Muslim
masses in reverting the ways of Prophet Muhammad as an ideal life-
form. The aim is to remove the stains of  materialism from the hearts
–––––––––––––––––
13 Barbara D. Metcalf, “Living Hadith in the Tabli>ghi> Jama’a>t,” The Journal of
Asian Studies, Vol.52, No.3 (1993); Barbara D. Metcalf, ‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism:
Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Barbara D. Metcalf, “Meandering
Madrasas: Knowledge and Short-Term Itinerancy in the Tablighi Jama’at,” in Nigel
Crook (ed.), The Transmission of Knowledge in South Asia: Essays on Education, Religion,
History, and Politics, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1996); Barbara D. Metcalf, “The
Madrasa Deoband: A Model of Religious Education in India,” Modern Asian Studies,
12, 1 (1978); Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Contentations: Essays on Muslims in India and
Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Barbara D. Metcalf, “”Traditionalist”
Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” in Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and
Ashley Timmer (eds.), Understanding September 11, (New York: Social Science Research
Council, 2002).
14 Dietrich Reetz, “Living Like the Pious Ancestors: The Social Ideal of the
Missionary of  the Tablighi Jama’at,” in DAVO Conference (Hamburg: 2005), p. 209.
15 M. Anwarul Haq, The Faith Movement of  Mawla>na> Muhammad Ilya>s (London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1972), p. 45.
16 Tahmina Rashid, “Radical Islam Movements: Gender Construction in Jamaat-
I-Islami and Tabligh-Ijamaat in Pakistan,” Strategic Analysis, 30, 2 (2006), p. 56.
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and mind of Muslim and inculcate in them a high moral order and
guide them toward righteousness and Islamic spirituality.”17
Mawlana Muhammad Ilya>s was affiliated with the Tari>qah
Naqhshabandiyyah, a Sufi order that considered the observance of  shari>‘ah
as an integral part of  their Sufi practices. He was born in 1885 in the
town of Kadhla, part of the Muzaffarnar district, and his family was
particularly noted for its piety and commitment to Islamic reform
spearheaded by the distinguished eighteenth century scholar Delhi,
Shah Waliullah (1703-62).18 Mawlana was also one of  the most
influential scholars who graduated from the Deabond school, located
in a small country town north-east of Delhi, where the original madrasah
or seminary of the movement was founded in 1867. This school played
an important role in developing Islamic education in India, since it
produced many famous Muslim scholars such as Abu A’la al-Maududi,
the founder of Jamat-i-Islami in Pakistan. It is also believed that most
of  the Taliban19 who pursuing jiha>d in Aghanistan are Deobandi.
However, the teachers at this school are likely to have been influenced
by Shah Waliullah, an Islamic reformist who influenced Mawlana’s
family. Metcalf  writes that “Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was an offshoot of  the
Deoband movement … it represented an intensification of the original
Deobandi commitment to individual regeneration apart from any
explicit political program.”20 Mawlana joined Deoband in 1908 and
later became an instructor at one of  Deoband’s sister institutions –
Mazahir al-‘Ulu>m in Saharanpur.21
There were several reasons for the emergence of  the Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh movement in India. First, Mawlana’s intention to return the
umma to the tradition of  the Prophet through the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was a
–––––––––––––––––
17 Jan Ali, “Islamic Revivalism: The Case of  the Tablighi Jama’at,” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 23, 1 (2003), p. 175.
18 Yoginder Sikand, “The Tablighi Jama’at and Politics: A Critical Re-Appraisal,”
The Muslim World 96 (2006), p. 178.
19 On Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia (London: Yale University, 2000).
20 Metcalf, Islamic Contentations: Essays on Muslims in India and Pakistan, p. 265,
21 R. Upadhyay, “Islamic Revivalism: The Curious of  Tabligh Jama’at,” http://
www.saag.org/papers6/paper569.html.
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response to militant Hindu efforts of suddhi (purification) and sangatan
(consolidation) among Indians taking place at that time.23 In 1922, this
Hindu revivalist movement called Arya Samaj promoted a well-
organized campaign to return to the fold a large number of Muslim
groups that still retained many Hindu customs.23 Mawlana intended to
purify Muslim practices in Mewat, South India, the place where the
Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh emerged, not only because some Muslims were being
converted to Hinduism by militants, but also because of their
maintenance of  Hindu cultural traditions.
Second, the establishment of  the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was as a result
of a reaction to the decline of khila>fah movement in the Muslim world.
It is believed that in 1920s, Islamic resurgences that emerged in the
Muslim world were related to the failure of the Khila>fah Isla>miyyah
(Islamic caliphate). Many Islamic movements promoted the concept
of the return to the Qur’an and Sunnah as the pathway to the
establishment of a new Islamic society which called as khila>fah
Isla>miyyah. In this context, the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh desired to bring the ummah
(Islamic community) together through the education and reform of
individuals.24 Mawlana Muhammad Ilya>s, according to one author, “felt
disappointed with the failure of the khila>fah movement and the
assertive role of Hindu leaders in the freedom movement” in India.25
It is often claimed that the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh is an apolitical Islamic
movement that is not concerned with the establishment of Islamic
state.  However, this movement does have a certain political agenda,
one to be pursued by means in the area of  the reform of  the individual.26
–––––––––––––––––
22 Mumtaz Ahmad, “The Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-I-Islami
and the Tablighi of  South Asia,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.),
Fundamentalism Observed, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991),
p. 511.
23 Sikand, “The Tablighi Jama’at and Politics: A Critical Re-Appraisal”, p. 180.
24 Ahmad, “The Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-I-Islami and the
Tablighi of  South Asia”, p. 516.
25 Upadhyay, “Islamic Revivalism: The Curious of  Tabligh Jama’at”.
26 See also  Yoginder Sikand, “The Tablighi Jama’at and Politics,” ISIM Newsletter,
13 (2003), pp. 42-43.
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From this historical background it is interesting to note that the
Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was originally a response to local issue and agenda in
South Asia. During the emergence of this movement there were also
some other Islamic movements that have the same agenda, i.e., calling
the ummah to return to the Qur’a>n and the Sunnah. However, the Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh was also likely influenced by broader social political and religious
developments, such as the decline of the Islamic chaliphate in the Muslim
world. Thus, even though the movement was originally not a political,
it could not escape from political influence.  Masud maintains that:
The Khila>fat movement utilized the techniques of missionaries
and shaped the methodology of  Da‘wa in India along modern lines.
Muslim leaders learned the skills of modern organisation, publicity
techniques, mass contact and the use of the printing press from
Khila>fat… Mawlana Muhammad Ilya>s, the founder of  the Tabli>ghi> Jama‘at,
benefited from this movement greatly.27
Third, there is a tendency to view the establishment of  the Jama’at
Tabli>gh as the result of  the dissemination of  Sufism among tari>qah
(mysticism sect) groups in South Asia.28 It is argued that the Jama>‘at
Tabli>gh is part of  the Deoband school, a reformed Hanafi Sunnism
which eschews the cult of saints but accepts a purified from of Sufism.
Mawlana Ilyas was himself as a member of the Chistiyyah Sufis in India.29
This Sufi group did not focus on the conversion of non-Muslims to
Isla>m, because their objective was to provide spiritual guidance to the
people. It is thus not surprising that the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh focused more
on spiritual matters than social and political issues, which were so
important for other Islamic movements. The other Sufi movement that
influenced Mawlana in his teaching was the Qadiriyah, which
disassociated themselves from rulers and political affairs.30
However, Mawlana did not adopt the Sufi way of life, in which
one lives at home and waits for people to come to learn from him. He
–––––––––––––––––
27 Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith: Studies of  the Tabli>ghi>
Jama>’at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. ii.
28 Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren, and Tarekat: Tradisi-Tradisi Islam Di Indonesia;
Haq, The Faith Movement of  Mawla>na> Muhammad Ilya>s.
29 Haq, The Faith Movement of  Mawla>na> Muhammad Ilya>s.
30 Ibid., p. 59.
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went out to visit people, dispensing spiritual guidance on how to live
as a Muslim. Mawlana developed seven principles which are taken
from Sufi practices: the article of faith, prayer, knowledge (of the
principle of Islam) and remembrance (of God), respect for Muslims,
sincerity of purpose, donation of time, and absence from useless and
worldly talk.31 These principles become the pillar for all members of
the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. In 1934, according to Masud (2000) Mawlana
announced the guiding principles for the movement as follows:
Correct memorization of  the formulated faith
Regularity in the performance of  prayers.
Education and promotion of knowledge.
Formal appearance in accordance with Islam.
Adherence to Islamic customs and elimination of idolatrous
practices.
Purdah (veiling) for women.
Strict observance of  Islamic practices in marriage ceremonies.
Promotion of Islamic dress for women.
Abiding by the Islamic faith and rejection of  other religions.
Regard for each other’s rights.
Necessity of the participation of responsible persons of the
community in all meetings.
Teaching children about religion prior to formal education.
Efforts for the propagation of religion.
Observing cleanliness.
Protecting each other’s honor.32
In fact, these principles were similar to those of many other
Islamic movements in the 1900s. However, the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh programs
seem to be mixed between Pan-Islam and Islamic Sufism. Pan-Islam,
which was originally promoted by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837-1897),
aims to unify Muslim around the world under an Islamic world
community, due to the abolition of  Islamic caliphate by Republican
–––––––––––––––––
31 Haq, The Faith Movement of  Mawla>na> Muhammad Ilya>s, p. 66.
32 Masud, Travellers in Faith.
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Turkey in 1924.33 In Southeast Asia, for example, many Islamic
organizations inspired by this movement, such as Paderi, Persatuan
Islam, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and the Kaum Muda movement,
promoted purification through the practice of similar principles
implemented by the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. In addition, the program of  the
“purification” of Muslim practices was heavily influenced by Islamic
pioneers in the Middle East, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani,
Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Rashid Ridha. The main objective of  their
movement was calling the ummah to return to the Qur’an and the
Sunnah. The Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh, however, did not intend to ‘bring back
ummah to the Qur’an and the Sunnah’ through political action or
involvement in the government; rather “to bring about a reawakening
of  faith and a reaffirmation of  the religio-cultural identity of  Muslims.”34
The Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh took their example from the al-Khulafa>’ al-Ra>syidu>n
in the early Islamic world and justified that their ideology by reference
to the Qur’an and Hadi>th.35
Regarding Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh utilizing the Sufi methods, Haq says
that:
Ilya>s adopted sufi terms and practices such as zikr, mura>qabahi, and
chillah with certain changes, to popularize Sufism and create a better
understanding of it among the masses; at the same time he sought to
eliminate abuses which had crept into sufi orders contributing to their
unpopularity among certain section of  the community.36
Many scholars believe that the activities of  the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
movement began when Mawlana made his pilgrimage in 1926.37
–––––––––––––––––
33 Avraham Sela (ed.), The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of  the Middle East,
revised and updated ed., (New York: Continuum, 2002).
34 Ahmad, “The Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-I-Islami and the
Tablighi of  South Asia”, p. 511.
35 Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Ideology and Legitimacy” in Masud, Travellers
in Faith, p. 105.
36 Haq, The Faith Movement of  Mawla>na> Muhammad Ilya>s, p. 173.
37 Muhammad Khalid Masud, “The Growth and Development of  the Tabli>ghi>
in India,” in Masud , Travellers in Faith, p. 9.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 2, 2008 M/1429 H 363
The History of  Jama >‘ah Tabli>gh in Southeast Asia
However, it is unlikely that the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh movement started in
1926  due to that fact that during this period Mawlana Ilya>s made
many journeys to perform the Hajj. His first hajj was in 1914, while in
1916 he returned to his teaching at the madrasah.38 In 1926, he made
his second hajj after he lived for five months in Medina, before returning
to India with the conviction that the task of preaching should be
undertaken among the masses. During his stay in Medina in his second
hajj, Mawlana Ilya>s did preach Islam and even unwilling to leave
Medina. This method was then be adopted as da‘wa method by Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh members when they preach Islam. Thus, the Jama‘ah Tabli>gh
movement began in 1930s, when Mawlana completed his fourth hajj
and met the Sultan, King Ibn Sa‘u>d, on March 1938. The objective of
his meeting with the King was to obtain his permission to preach Islam.
Mawlana Ilya>s, accompanied by ‘Abdullah al-Dihlawi, ‘Abdur Rahman
Mazhar, and Ihtishamul, met the Sultan on 14 March in the same.
King Ibn Sa’u>d received them with great honor and talked to them for
a while, after which the visitors presented their petition and took leave
of  him.39 I suspect that Mawlana Ilya>s requested permission to the
King to preach Islam in Saudi Arabia for political reasons. Once the
King gave permission he would have the authority to preach Islam in
his country and in the Middle East. During this era, King Saud had a
close relationship with the Wahabi movement which was influenced
by Ibn Taymiyyah as one of  the ulama who inspired the fundamentalist
movement in the Muslim world.
It is unlikely that we will find sources on the trans-nationalization
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh during Mawlana Ilyas life time. Nevertheless, soon
after his death in 1944, his son, Mawlana Muhammad Yusuf
Kandahlawi (1917-1965) became the new amir (head) of the
movement40 and had agenda to promote the movement around the
world. It is reported that under the leadership of  Mawlana Yusuf  the
Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh spread to all part of  India, Pakistan, and beyond, to
–––––––––––––––––
38 Haq, The Faith Movement of  Mawla>na> Muhammad Ilya>s, p. 87.
39 Ibid., p. 93.
40 Masud, “The Growth and Development of  the Tabli>ghi> in India”, pp. 13-17.
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countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, England, Japan,
and the USA.41
Thus, the internationalization of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh began under
Mawlana Yusuf  leadership, who widened the scope of  da‘wa, not only
to Muslims but also to non-Muslims.42 Troll asserts that “from his time
onwards Jama’ahs began moving out over the whole world, on foot, by
bus, train or airplane or any other suitable means.”43  In sum, by 1962,
after eighteen years Mawlana Yusuf  as amir of  the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh, a
worldwide network had been established stretching from Tokyo to
Chicago.44
1. The Coming of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh to Malaysia
In Kuala Lumpur, Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was introduced by Maulana
Abdul Malik Madani, who came to Singapore and Selangor in 1952, as
a representative of his markaz (headquarter) at Nizamuddin.45 Initially
the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh received support in towns, such as Penang, Kuala
Lumpur and Singapore where there were a large Indian Muslim
communities. More recently, with the resurgence of  Islamic missionary
activities, the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh has succeeded in penetrating the Malay
–––––––––––––––––
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171-193.
43 Troll, “Five Letters of  Maulana Ilyas (1885-1944), the Founder of  the Tablighi
Jama’at Translated, Annotated and Introduced”, p. 142.
44 Gaborieau, “The Transformation of  Tabli>ghi> Jama>’at into a Transnational
Movement”, p. 230.
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community, even at village.46 In the 1970s, the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh started
to recruit Malay people to membership. The first group they approached
was Darul Arqam leader, Ustaz Ashaari Haji Muhammad. He then
made a journey (khuru>j) with his followers as Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh members
to Singapore for 10 days,47 adopting the Tradition of  Muhammad.48
According to Nagata “like Darul Arqam, Tabli>gh is fundamentalist in
orientation: through da‘wa, it aims both revive and clarify the basic
teachings of the Koran, and to show their relevance to modern
society.”49 In addition, Syed Serajul Islam maintains, that “they started
going around the country by preaching the message of Islam. They
held informal talks to the people asking them to return to the true
path of Isla>m.”50
Regarding the coming of  Tabli>ghists from India to Malaysia, one
of  senior karku>n in Kuala Lumpur, Tuan Haji Hassan, told me the
story that the first target of the mission was to attract Indian-Muslims,
not Malays. Tuan Haji Hassan worked for a company in Kuala Lumpur,
but had been a member of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in his home country, India.
He was able to speak Tamil, Urdu, English, and Malay. His family
came from Pakistan and settled in Kuala Lumpur in the early 1940s.
During his period in India, he met some Mawlana in Nizamuddin. He
may have even met Mawlana Yusuf  while he was doing Tabli>ghist
activities at the international markaz.  As indicated above, Mawlana
Yusuf  sent out many groups of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh abroad, including to
Malaya. In this context, Tuan Haji Hassan became the representative
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Malaysia. Historically, during the coming of  Jama>‘ah
Tabli >gh to Malaya, there was the increasing number of  Indian
community in Malaya such as in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Singapore.
–––––––––––––––––
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Regarding the migration of Indians to Malaya, Sandhu writes “the
dominant factor in the increase of the Indian population in Malaya
was the excess of  immigrants over emigrants.”51 Thus, the main target
of  karku>n was to attract the Indian community rather than Malay. This
is because the Malay community in that era was still considered as
‘second class’ and most of the businessmen were Chinese and Indian.
They controlled and employed the Malay people in plantation. When I
interviewed Nazaruddin, an Indian-Malay who was born in Malaysia
before 1957 and a member of karku>n, about the reasons why Malay
marginalized Indian community in Malaysia, he answered:
This is because our old generation treated Malays very badly. Many
Indian businessmen employed Malays in their rubber plantation and
‘categorized’ Malays as ‘second class.’ Now, they have taken revenge on
our second and third generations, where Malays have become the elite
and controlled the government and categorized us as ‘second class.’
Muzaffar provides us another picture of the marginalization of
Indians after independence:
It was this prosperity that brought some indirect benefits to the
disadvantaged by way of  schools, health clinics, piped water supply,
electricity, and the like. The India poor gained from these developmental
efforts, as did the poor in other communities. At the same time, it was
an expanding economy and the concomitant prosperity which enabled
groups of Indians, among others, to establish themselves in the middle
and upper classes. Some of  theses Indian professional and business
elite even managed to wield a little bit of influence over the government
process.52
Tuan Haji Hassan and Nazaruddin are Indian-businessmen, not
the representative of  ‘the poor community’ in Kuala Lumpur. In this
context, it can be said that the target group of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was the
elite or the businessmen in the city. The first group, according to Tuan
–––––––––––––––––
51 Kernial Singh Sandhu, “The Coming of the Indians to Malaysia,” in K.S.
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Haji Ahmad, was received by Tan Sri Zainuddin in his house.
Nazaruddin is the son of  Tan Sri Zainuddin. They own a company of
Zainuddin Corporation. When the group came to Kuala Lumpur, Tuan
Haji Rahman arranged a meeting with Tan Sri Zainuddin who asked
them to stay at Masjid India. Many lands around Masjid Jamik are owned
by Indian-Muslim, especially Tan Sri Zainuddin. They built the mosque
only for Indian-Muslims, while another mosque built by South Asians
people in Kuala Lumpur is the Masjid Pakistan, located in the Chow
Kit trade area.
I would like to argue that the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh strategy in Kuala
Lumpur was very successful, because they received a warm welcome
from Indian-Muslim businessmen in Kuala Lumpur. At the same time,
Malays still did not know much about the movement. Nazaruddin was
used to khuru>j with his father traveling around Malaysia from Kuala
Lumpur to Ipoh, Penang, and Kedah. Tuan Haji Hassan, for example,
traveled around the Malay Peninsula in 1960s on foot from one mosque
to another as part of  khuru>j. To assist the arrival of  Indian-karku>n, he
was familiar with the immigration staff at the airport. Thus whoever
Indian people came to Malaysia, the staff would call him for
‘confirmation.’  He was closed to some Indian-Muslim businessmen in
Kuala Lumpur and was one of the administrative staff of Masjid India.
When a group of karku>n arrived at the airport, an immigration
official called him to ask about the group. It seems that this was the
first time Malays met of Muslims wearing gamez. It 1958 Malay dress
was influenced by the fashion that they saw in P. Ramlee’s movies,53
where the real Malays wore sarong (traditional sheath dress for Muslim)
and kopiah (headdress worn by Muslim man and also by Indonesian
men in general as a symbol of national identity) and not Arabic or
South Asian style Muslim fashion. The coming of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was
just five years before Malaysian independence, when the transition
from Malay-British oriented to the Malayness happened, after which
Malay people are defined as those who have three characteristics: Islam,
–––––––––––––––––
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Malay language, and born before 1957 in Tanah Melayu (The Land of
Malay).54
 In this context, Indian-Muslims could be categorized as Malays
in the sense that they were Muslims, spoke Malays, and were born
before the independence. So, their style could be called Malay, including
their Islamic style of life. However, India-Muslims also wear the gamez
as a symbol of  India or Persian clothing style. For example, according
to an Indian- Muslim, the turban is not part of Malay custom, it comes
from Turkey, called Turbush. Thus, it can be argued that this fashion
originated from Indian and Pakistan. According to him Malays could
not claim that this fashion belonged to them. It is interesting to
emphasize the role of India-Muslims in Malaysia in disseminating
Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. As Nagata points out “Tabli>gh could thus be seen as
one means whereby the marginal Indian-Muslim can achieve recognition
as a Malay or bumiputra, the most effective route through religion and
culture.”55
Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh paid little attention to the social-political situation
in Malaysia. They traveled around the country from one mosque to
another, from one state to another. Nazaruddin, for example, told me
about his childhood following his father traveling on khuru>j to many
places. During this period most members did not tell people about the
–––––––––––––––––
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name of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. They only slept in a mosque, then continued
to another mosque, inviting local people to join them on their trip. The
main targets were Indian-mosques, for example in Penang at Masjid
Kapitan Keling. When I traveled to Penang to visit this mosque, a local
man told me the history of  Tabli>ghist in the area. For him, whoever
spread the message of  the Prophet is a Tabli>ghist. Thus, da‘wa in Malaya,
according to him, was started by Indian-Muslims, when Islam first
arrived in Nusantara. He did not know about the coming of  Tabli>ghists
to his area. However, the surrounding area was dominated by Indian.
Along the road, Indian-Muslims sold jewelry and changed money.
Nazaruddin said that most Indian businesses are in trade and rubber
plantations. In Penang, Indian-Muslims employed Malays from Kedah
as workers in their company. I would say that the coming of  Tabli>ghist
to states in Malaysia could be seen as the Islamic missionary only for
India Muslims. In this period Malays were struggling for their
independence from the British. However, the migration of Chinese
and Indian to Malaya and the role of British toward Malay had reached
a ‘cultural space’ for members of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh to spread ‘South Asian
Islamic values.’ Regarding the position of  Malays and other ethnic group
in Malaya in relation to Indians, Hwang writes “ …for the Indians, the
majority of  them were estate workers. This meant that the majority of
the Malays was generally found in the lower income economics activities
while the non-Malay were found in the higher-level economic
activities.”56 It can be said that the coming of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in the
early period was a part of  the culturalizing of  Malays in terms of  Islamic
fashion and lifestyle.
One of the focal reasons for this argument is the fashion of
Muslim in 1960s that could show how the Muslim culture in term of
fashion was, as exposed in P. Ramlee movies. In his movie Kasim
Selamat, for example, Indian ethnic is represented as a ‘big boss’, while
the Malay-Muslims wearing sarong and kebaya seen as the representative
of Muslim culture in public space. In another movie, Malay are shown
as the poor laborers for Indian-Muslim, as in Labu and Labi and
–––––––––––––––––
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sometimes Malay had internal problem such as seeking the beautiful
girl or struggling with their families. In Ramlee’s movies, we do not see
Malay Muslims wearing gamez or other Middle Eastern dress. Instead,
Malays are more likely to be influenced by British lifestyles. Kahn writes
“Ramlee film …provides a window on culture and society in British
Malaya in the late colonial period.”57 Kahn also notes that ‘in Ramlee
films about contemporary Malay life in Singapore or the Peninsula,
villages are problematic spaces riddled with conflict between rich and
poor, patriarchs and modern young women seeking to decide their own
fates.58 In other words, the portrait of  Malay culture as ‘real bumiputera’
was not the case for Islamic culture in late colonial period. Thus, Malays
who wore the gamez after 1970 were likely to be influenced by the
presence of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh or other Islamic movements which promoted
South Asian or Middle Eastern lifestyle. This is also deconstructed by
Kahn when he compares the Malay fashion which appeared in the P.
Ramlee movies and the portrayal of the contemporary Malay musicians
Raihan in their performances:
It would be wrong to suggest … that Islam was not a significant part
of the Ramlee image. Here religious ideas seem to be inextricably bound
up with symbols of  Malayness, a good example being dress. There is
no mistaking the fact that Ramlee is, in most of  his films, a Malay,
because he is wearing clothing that clearly signals this fact. Raihan
…performers …wear clothes that would never have been seen in
Malay villages in Ramless’s time. Their clothing styles are, at least in
contemporary Malaysia, Islamic or even Middle Eastern, not Malay.59
I would say that most Muslims who wore the gamez dress in
‘Middle Eastern style’ were the great ulama in the pondok (Islamic
boarding school), not ordinary Muslims. Many pictures of  Malay pioneer
of Islamic revival show that they adopted South Asian or Middle Eastern
fashion such as tarbush and gamez.
–––––––––––––––––
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The meeting of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh and Malays began in 1969 when
there was national riot60 and the development of spirit of Islamic
revivalism in Malaysia. Abdullah says that “the 1969 may be considered
the launching pad for Malaysia’s da‘wa phenomenon.”61 However,
Shamsul says in his From British to Bumiputera Rule that “the 13 May
1969 incident was ironically a blessing in disguise for the Malay
capitalist.”62 I would say that there is relation in arguments, because
the spirit of Islamic revivalism then could be seen from the meeting of
Young Malay with the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. One of  the outcomes of  this
riot was NEP (National Economic Policy). However, Shamsul
maintains that “it is not uncommon for scholars to assume that the
NEP was formulated solely as a government response to the bloody
incident.”63 Regarding ‘the meeting’ of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh with Malays
during the riot, Nazaruddin told me about Malay people who
demonstrated in Chinese business areas (Chow Kit) in several parts of
Kuala Lumpur. In Kampung Baru, a Malay dominated area, many Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh members were conducting khuru>j in Masjid Kampung Baru, while
other Malays were demonstrating against the Chinese. After the
demonstration was over, Malays went to the mosque. The Tabli>ghist
who were Indian served meals. Nazaruddin noted that most young
Malay become interested in Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh activity. In this era, it is
widely recognized that many demonstrators, even the pioneers were
students at the University of Malaya. At the same time Masjid
Abdurrahman was established in the area of  the university and became
the centre for the young-Malay karku>n in Kuala Lumpur after the
national riots. Nazaruddin therefore argued that the spirit of  Islamic
revivalism in Malaysia had been influenced by the spirit of Islamic
mission (da‘wa) which was promoted by the members of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh.
In this context, it can be argued, as Seng says, that in 1970s many
–––––––––––––––––
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Malays were attracted to Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh and became it members.64
After the May 1969 national riot, many da‘wa movements in
Malaysia emerged. Some say that this was a sign of the influence of
the Iranian Revolution in 1979 or the Islamic movement situation in
Indonesia, especially among students. However, I would disagree with
the argument, because the establishment of da‘wa movements in
Malaysia taken place before the Iranian revolution.65 ABIM (Muslim
Youth Movement of  Malaysia), for example, was established in 1971
by several ex-student of the National Association of Malaysian Islamic
Students (PKPIM). According to Jomo and Cheek “since its formation,
ABIM has received its strongest support from Muslim youth in
institutions of  higher learning.”66 This movement aimed at calling for
the introduction of  Islamic law, educational and economic system, and
political reform.67 Darul Arqam, an Islamic da‘wa movement founded
by Ashaari Muhammad who had traveled with Jama>‘ahTabli>gh to
Singapore, was formed in 1968. It was originally called Rumah Putih
(White House). However, on 28 February 1981, the name of  group
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was changed to Darul Arqam, in memory of a companion (sah}a>bah) of
the Prophet of Muhammad, al-Arqam ibn Abi> al-Arqam, who allowed
his house in Mecca to be used as early meeting place for Muslims.68
In response to the emergence of da‘wa movements in Malaysia,
the government also made many da‘wa foundations. These included
YADIM (Yayasan Dakwah Islam Malaysia) which was established in 1974
and JAKIM (Jawatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia) which formed by the
Malay Sultans in 1968. There was also other important da‘wa movement,
namely PERKIM (Muslim Welfare Organization of  Malaysia), funded
by the government elites for special purpose to promote Islam to
atheists or to train newly converted Muslims about Islam. It was
founded by a group of  prominent Malaysian Muslims, including Tunku
Abdul Rahman Putra, Tan Sri S.O.K. Obaidillah (an Indian Muslim),
Haji Ibrahim Ma (a Chinese Muslim), and Tan Sri Mubin Sheppard.
It is important to note that Tan Sri S.O.K. Obaidillah was a pioneer
of  the Jama>‘ahTabli>gh movement in Malaysia. As an Indian-Muslim who
had migrated to Malay in 1938, he played an important role in many
aspects of  social, religious, economic, and political affairs in the country.
He was a founding father of MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) and
FIO (Federation of  Indian Organization), two Indian political
movements used as the vehicles to promote Indian interests in Malaysia.
In 1950 he established AICC (Association Indian Chambers of
Commerce), Indian business organization. Besides this, he was also a
vice director of NCCI (National Chambers of Commerce and Industry).
In social affairs, he established the MECA (Malayan Employer’s
Consultative) and PERKIM.69  But, it is less often noted that he was
also a Tabli>ghist and chairman of  the Masjid India. He is a successful
Indian-Muslim businessman and owns many companies which are now
run by his sons. I would like to argue that the reason why Jama>‘ahTabli>gh
was well accepted by Indian Muslim traders was because of the
influence of Obaidullah.
In the 1980s, the Malaysia witnessed the increasing influence of
Islam in many aspects of life. Mahathir Mohammad who was a prime
–––––––––––––––––
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minister launched his policy to ‘Islamize’ Malaysia under government
policy via the vehicle of the UMNO (United Malays National
Organization) and it alliance Barisan Nasional. At the same time, the
da‘wa movements also played an important role in Malaysian
Islamization by adopting a socio cultural approach.70 PAS, as an
opposition Islamic party in the country, utilized the charisma of  ‘ulama>
in the socio-political arena and campaigned the Islamisation of Malaysia
through political power by establishing an Islamic state and
implementing Islamic law.71  Thus, this decade was an era of  various
attempts to promote Islam as the spirit of  Malayness.
In fact, Islam was understood as an essential part of Malayness
in the Malaysian nation state. Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was in the situation in
which they where renegotiating Malayness. The Constitution states
that a Malay is Muslim, but in fact not every Muslim in Malaysia is
Malay. The process of  defining Malay privilege in many aspects of
social-political life leads to a homogenization of identity among
Muslims in the country. An Indian Muslim told me that Indians must
–––––––––––––––––
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think about a clear cut of their identity in Malaysia. Due to the fact
that Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was not part of  the political elite, the movement
was not seen as part of  the ‘process of  Islamization of  Malaysia.’
However, the spirit of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh activities has revived the spirit
of  Islam among Malays since the 1980s. This is not to say that the
government did not give attention to the movement, as Nagata says
that “Government and party (UMNO) authorities too, far from viewing
Tabli >gh’s non-political stance as praiseworthy, have somewhat
paradoxically accused it of persuading Muslims to ‘stay away from the
ballot box’, thus presumably weakening the Malay based on  the
electorate and vote, and have asserted that “Islam and politics do not
go together.”72
Because of  this accusation, Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh began to be accused
as deviant teaching. An informant, a senior anthropologist in Malaysian
National University (UKM), told me that the government warned the
Malay people not to join this movement because it promoted ‘laziness’
among Malay-Muslims. According to her, the government filmed a
drama at RTM (Malaysian Radio Television) on the impact of  Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh on a Malay family. This film, showed how the Malay family
failed when a family member joined Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. In 1992, because
the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh activities were accused as promoting ‘laziness’ and
‘deviants’ teaching, some states in Malaysia banned the movement. In
the mid of March of the year, the Malacca state announced the banning
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh because its follower were engaging on mystical life
or ascetic activities thereby neglecting their responsibility in the world.73
The State Executive Council or  Tan Sri Abdul Rahim said that many
government employees followed the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh and forgot the duties
of  their office. He said that “many Tabli>gh followers are only interested
in attending gathering in mosques and saraus to the point of neglecting
their jobs and families.”74 Before the Malacca announcement, it is
reported that Sabah state also notified the people that Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
was prohibited because of  it promotion of  laziness among Malay. Some
–––––––––––––––––
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say that this announcement was delivered four years before the ban
of  Malacca.75 One reason for the banning of  Tabli>gh in Sabah was
because of deviant teaching and which subsequently challenged the
charisma and authority of the Sabah Islamic Council.76
While Sabah and Malacca prohibited the activities of  Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh, other states such as Kelantan,  Terengganu, Negeri Sembilan
Johor and Perak did not ban the movement. The Deputy State
Executive Council for Kelantan, Abdul Halim Abdul Rahman,
commenting the banning of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Malacca said “if  the
movement’s activities were questionable, the State Government would
discuss the matter with the movement’s leaders and try to correct them
if  they were found to be wrong.”77 Fadzil Noor, a PAS leader in
Terengganu, said that “the ban is not good for the development of
Islamic dakwah in the country.”78 However, in some states like Johor
and Perak, the Islamic Council only monitored the movement, waiting
for formal ruling by the mufti. But, there were no formal decisions
from State Departement of  Religious Affairs. The Central Government
did not respond formally to the banning of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. Pusat Islam,
a government institution for Islamic affairs, conducted a study of the
movement and its impact on Malays. The government sent one of  its
staff  members to be a karku>n to spy on the activities of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh,
but he concluded that there were ‘no problems’ with the teachings of
the movement. Thus, the banning of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was emphasized
the outside image of  karku>n, who were accused as laziness Muslim. It is
interesting to note that during the 1990s, the government backed up
to Malay to be involved in the development of Malaysia. The ex-Deputy
of Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Othman in national newspaper
mentioned that Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh is not anti-Islam, but their approach
and missionary activities could cause detrimental effects on Muslims
in Malaysia.79 A week after his interview, on behalf  of  Pusat Islam, he
said that there was no evidence to support the banning of  Jama>‘ah
–––––––––––––––––
75 “Muis Haram Tabligh,” Berita Harian, 14 March 1992.
76 Ibid.
77 “No Plans by Perak, Kelantan to Ban Tabligh”, New Strait Times, 13 March
1992.
78 Ibid.
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Tabli>gh in the country.80 However, to control and monitor this
movement, JAWI (The Islamic Religious Department of  Federal
Territory) would ‘involve’ itself  in the administration of  the mosque
at Sri Petaling.
Regarding the ban and other issue in media about the negative
image of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh, its followers did not comment or even
challenged the government decision. This strategy was quite successful
and, during this time, the number of  people joining Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
increased and even a mosque belongs to this movement was established
in Sri Petaling. They also accepted the government decision to take
over the Sri Petaling mosque. A karku>n said that they established
mosque because of Alla>h and they would finish it even if the
government took over its administration.81 It would not be wrong to
say that this strategy attracted more Malays to the movement, because
the markaz was seen as under the ‘control’ of government. In other
words, if  the government did not see that Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh practiced
deviant teaching, it was safe for Malays to join the movement. Thus,
there was still no attempt from the government to ban this movement,
and this led to the establishment of  the Jama>‘ah throughout Malaysia,
even in Malacca and Sabah.
I met a karku>n from Sabah who told me about the development
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Sabah. He said that there are more karku>n in
Sabah, especially among newly converted Chinese Muslims. Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh provides direct guidance for new-Muslims in worshipping Allah.
Moreover, this assists the government program of encouraging da‘wa
among non-Muslims. Besides this, he added that the steady increase
of Islam in Sabah was also due to the fact that most of Chinese Muslims
in the state are influential businessmen. There had also been significant
growth in Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh activity in Malacca, especially among
government and privates companies’ employees. This is because the
markaz always conducts tafakkud (interview) before a karku>n departs
for khuru>j. As the result, employees are able to arrange their leave to
–––––––––––––––––
79 “5000 Pekerja Awam Ikuti Tabligh”, Berita Harian, 14 March 1992.
80 “Tiada Bukti Untuk Haram Tabligh”, Berita Harian, 21 March 1992.
81 “Gerakan Tabligh Tak Halang Jawi Ambil Alih Pentabiran Masjidnya Nilai $3
Juta”, Berita Harian, 18 March 1992.
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engage in da‘wa activities. It is worthy of  note that the Malacca state
markaz is seen as the place for sending karku>n to Indonesia through
Riau Province. When I attended an ijtima>‘ in Pekanbaru (the capital
city of Riau Province), many karku>ns from Malaysia had traveled
through Malacca by ferry and some of them were businessmen and
government employees or civil servants.
The development of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Malaysia had six phases.
The first involved the trans-nationalization of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh among
the Indian community in Malaysia, especially among Indian businessmen
in Kuala Lumpur. The second phase was characterized by the influence
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh on the template of  national history of  Malaysians
after the independence. This religious movement introduced a new
representation of  ‘real Muslim’ including the transformation of  Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh from an Indian fashion to Malay fashion. The third period is
the involvement of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in providing the spirit of  Islam for
young Malays in Kuala Lumpur. Centering its activities in the Masjid
Abdurrahman, Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh attracted many Malay students, while
the Masjid India turned into a centre for elder Malay and Indian Muslims.
When the students completed their studies, they were involved and
took part in spreading Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. The fourth was marked by the
penetration of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh to all of  Malay Muslims in Malaysia.
The penetration of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was not only addressed to many
well educated Malays, but also to Malay villagers in rural areas. The
fifth phase is critical period of  Jama>‘ah Tabligh development, because
its existence was questioned in several states, especially in Sabah and
Malacca. I would like to argue that in this era, the banning of  Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh is parallel with the cessation of  Darul Arqam. At this time the
government began to directly control over Islamic movements which
they felt might decrease the authority of the Malay elite. At the same
time, both Islamic movements (Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh and Darul Arqam) were
not registered, but they gained many new members from Malay Muslims
who were likely working as government staff or members of UMNO
and the Barisan Nasional. The final phase was marked by negotiation
between Jama>‘ah Tabli >gh and the government, especially in the
establishment of a mosque in Sri Petaling designed as the markaz of
the movement in Malaysia and the Asia Pacific, after the banning of
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this movement in Sabah and Malacca. By doing this, Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
attracted many more members, because it involved the government in
the administration of  the mosque. The public no longer saw Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh as deviant teachings. This dual strategy of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh has
implications for its success in penetrating the Malay Muslim community
in which this movement was able to establish more than 20 markazs in
Malaysia and to connect to other countries such as Indonesia, Thailand,
and Singapore.
2. The Coming of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh  to Aceh
There are no written accounts on the coming of karku>n to Aceh.
During my visits to several sub-districts in Aceh, I found that most
people did not understand what Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was. The first Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh in Aceh were members of  a group of  khuru>j from Malaysia in
the late 1969. Because they were mainly South Asian and not able to
speak Indonesian or Acehnese, some Malaysians translated their baya>n
into Indonesian language.  However, there was no response from
Muslims in Banda Aceh and the karku>n returned to Medan without
any new members. My informant told me that the main reason for this
was that the group had no understanding of the socio-cultural situation
of Muslims in Aceh. They came to Aceh with a mission, without
knowing about the daily lives of  local Muslims. He also maintained
that because they used Arabic words in ceramah or bayan, the audience
was confused about this group.
The second group of karku>n traveled to Aceh in the early 1980s
as one of their routes during their khuru>j in Indonesia. This group was
sent via Medan by a Malaysian markaz. In this group there were Malay,
African, Bangladeshi, Indian, and Egyptian karku>ns. The target mosque
was the Masjid Bayturrahman in Banda Aceh city, one of  the most famous
classic mosques in Indonesia. After they arrived by bus, they visited
the mosque, asking permission to do khuru>j for three days. Unfortunately
the imam masjid refused their request and asked them to leave the
mosque. After that, they visited the mosque at Cot Krueng to formulate
a strategy of  da‘wa called fikir (hesitation).
The ima>m masjid of  Cot Krueng, Tgk. Far, received the Jama>‘ah
for three days only. He welcomed the group as guests without assuming
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they were Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. During this trip, the karku>n did not inform
the people in Banda Aceh that their mission was associated with the
Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh movement.  Nevertheless, during the Jum’ah (Friday)
prayer at the Bayturrahman, this group invited some young Muslims to
hear about their mission without telling them about the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh.
One senior karku>n told me that he was surprised to find some local
Muslims wearing gamez, an Arabian style dress. He asked them to take
a photograph in front of the mosque. There are usually many
photographers in front of  the Bayturrahman mosque, who take pictures
of  visitors.  This is because the mosque is not only designed for prayer
and studying, but also for tourism.
The coming of  Tabli>gh in 1984 introduced a new model of  Muslim
fashion to Acehnese. It commonly recognized that in Aceh community,
they tend not to dress in Arabian style, instead wearing sarung and baju
koko. The students who were very interested in this group were two
students from the Faculty of Dakwah of the State Institute for Islamic
Studies (IAIN) Ar-Raniry. They were interested in the fashion of  karku>n.
One of  the students, works for the government of  Brunei Darussalam,
was graduated from this faculty, and the other student was an ima>m
masjid in a mosque in Kuala Lumpur. Because neither of  them were in
Banda Aceh when I visited, it was hard to get the historical background
of  the coming of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh to Aceh from their perspective.
However, I contacted one of them by e-mail regularly to get his
experiences about his involvement in the early of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. During
my return from Pekan Baru to Banda Aceh, I also met Tengku Kandar
at Polonia international airport when we were in transit. He told me
that students who interested in Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh were familiar with Islamic
issues. For them, the group of  karku>n has very different lifestyle and
offered a model of real Islam which almost similar to that of Islam in
Middle East. Kandar himself had never met a group of Muslims who
had gone overseas to spread the message of Islam all round the world.
In his words:
“I was impressed by the style of  Tabli>ghist. They tended to be low
profile and never pushed us directly to do their mission. Firstly we
joined their trip, then they asked to do as what they did. I did not
know that they were from Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. Later on, after we spent
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three days together, they said that we were a part of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
community. They asked us to revive the life of  mosque in Aceh.”
The karku>n also conducted khusu>si to religious leaders in Banda
Aceh city, such as the head of  Ulama Council of  Aceh. Through ikra>m
al-muslim (respect for Muslim), they explained the agenda of  Tabli>gh. It
is said that most religious leaders in Aceh did not reject Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh,
but neither gave them a green light. This indicates that Tabli>gh could
be spread in Aceh, even though most Acehnese were still not familiar
with this movement. The five students then become the representatives
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Aceh and held many meetings to attract young
Muslims to perform rituals of  Tabli>gh.
One of  young students, Tengku Kandar, a karku>n who works as
ima>m masjid in Kuala Lumpur City in Malaysia, graduated from the
IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies), said that he was doing khuru>j
only for three days with students at a Senior High School. He did not
tell the students that they were performed a Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh ritual. Most
of it activities were controlled by small group at the mosque at Cot
Krueng, a mosque subsequently demolished by the Tsunami in 26
December 2004. However, during the 1980s this mosque became the
Markaz for karku>n in Aceh. The Jama‘ahs from Jakarta or outside
Indonesia were sent to this mosque as part of khuruj in Aceh province.
They sent their member even to remote areas to do da‘wa. When I
interviewed a karku>n who had been involved in the first generation of
karku>n in Aceh, he said there were many challenges from the Acehnese.
For example, they were not allowed to conduct activities such as khuru>j
and bayan in mosques. They invited the shu>ra from Jakarta to help the
mission in Aceh. In December 1986, the shu>ra visited Aceh to assist
their strategy of  da‘wa in the province, and most karku>n were happy
for his help. They had a new spirit when they meet the shura, especially
when shu>ra wanted to help them by joining the Acehnese karku>n to
travel Aceh for forty days to promote the mission of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh.
They went on foot, by car or bus from one mosque to another. According
to one karku>n it was pleasant trip when most of Acehnese join the
mission. Karku>n called this trip across the entire province as ta‘a>ruf
(an introduction), which aims to promote Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh among ordinary
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people as well as the elite in Banda Aceh. One ustaz from Jakarta,
Ma’sum, visited local people on foot and Acehnese people received
him sympathetically. Ma’sum delivered baya>n on the issue of  how to
be a good Muslim by increasing submission to Alla>h by doing khuruj
and other Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh activities. He tried to avoid political issues
while conducting da‘wa.
The shu>ra also visited government offices to approach the elite
and intellectuals in Banda Aceh. They met the rector of the State
Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Ar-Raniry and Syiah Kuala
University to promote Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. Many students in both campuses
joined Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh and became the pioneers of  karku>n in Banda
Aceh. They also recruited many students to join their meetings in Cot
Krueng. Informal meetings also took place in masjid Bayturrahman as
part of general discussions about Islam among young Muslims in Banda
Aceh. Ustaz Ridha, the ami>r of Aceh, was interested in joining the
meeting of young students in the mosque hall. He did not understand
the agenda of the students to meet each other, but only saw there
were students after noon and late prayer (dhuhur and ‘ashar) who always
sitting together in circle. In fact, Ridho has a shop store near the mosque
and always went there to perform shalat Dhuhur and shalat I’sya and
even he attended one of the meetings and committed to do da‘wa
activity in Banda Aceh. He then being asked to become a member of
the karku>n because he has family relation to the head of the Indonesian
‘Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia). It is hoped if ustaz Ridha
became a Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh member, it would be easier to approach the
head of  MUI of  Aceh. However, the strategy was failed; the Jama>‘ah
could only persuaded ustaz Ridha, but not his family.
As I have noted most of  members Tabli>gh in Aceh at that time
were students from universities in Banda Aceh. They attracted to Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh was because it represents a real Islam. As part of  Jama>‘ah, they
were used to travel to Medan or abroad to do khuru>j, although they
realized what they did is part of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh program latter. In Medan,
one of  students learned the network of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Southeast
Asia. The first group who went khuru>j for forty days was a Jama>‘ah of
young karku>n from Banda Aceh who took trip from Medan to
Yogyakarta by bus. According to my informant, the members of  this
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group included ustaz Ridha, ustaz Darwan, and ustaz Ibrahim, etc. They
were the first Jama>‘ah from Aceh who went on khuru>j outside Aceh.
Later on, one of  this group served as a senior karku>n in Aceh.
From this generation I therefore understood about the promotion
of  the Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Banda Aceh through khuru>j. Senior and junior
high school student conducted khuru>j only on Sunday. They went to
markaz wearing gamez. From the markaz they then coordinated by Tengku
Kandar to take journey for one day only. It is reported that mostly
their trip of  khuruj take place around Banda Aceh city, because they
must go to school on Monday. Tengku Kandar told me that he uses his
bicycle to coordinate fellow Tabli>ghist and many students joined him
doing da‘wa on Saturday. He asked them to tell his friends that their
activity was only to fulfill the holiday.
From the above discussion, it is clear that students dominated
in the first phase of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Aceh. They did not join the
meeting on Thursday night, but on Saturday because they have to go
to school in weekdays. The history of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh was not without
challenge, since some Muslims in Aceh still opposed the movement.
When they conducted khuru>j, for example, local people accused them
of offering new interpretation of Islam. I would like to say that this
challenge was because the member of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh were very young.
In Aceh, the only people can teach or ask people to do good things
according to Islamic teaching was tengku which graduated from dayah.
They may in a bad situation when they deliver the message of Islam to
elder people in Aceh. One karku>n told me that when he was in North
Aceh doing khuruj, local ‘ulama> threw cow dong at them. However,
this young karku>n was trained not to seek revenge or to respond
negatively to local people. When the tengku threw the cow dong of
them, this young karku>n only recited astaghfirulla>h.
This hostility was a result of  the lack of  support of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
from MUI or well respected ‘ulama> in Banda Aceh. Karku>n in Banda
Aceh, with support from shu>ra of Jakarta attempted to overcome by
visiting the ‘ulama> and introducing Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh to them. However,
they did not receive a good response from the ulama. The karku>n
approached ‘ulama as a means of ikra>m al-muslim (respect for Muslim)
which was seen as an appropriate way to get more followers in Aceh.
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As mentioned above, the first generation of karku>n in Aceh was
students who did not have religious authority, even if  they were studying
at an Islamic university like IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies).
They also faced the negative reaction from traditional ulama in dayah
(an Islamic traditional institution that produce ‘ulama> in Aceh).
While there was no positive signal from the ‘ulama, the karku>n
with strong support from markaz  Kebon Jeruk Jakarta still played an
important role in disseminating Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Aceh. After they had
completed their studies, they went out for khuru>j in IPB or negeri jauh
(overseas). In this context, the markaz always send the Jama>‘ah to Aceh
to help karku>n in Aceh. During my field work, most of these young
karku>n had become senior karku>n in Banda Aceh, although the pioneers
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh were no longer in Banda Aceh. This indicates that
the process of  recruitment had been successful since the total number
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Aceh by than exceeded 10000. Acehnese karku>n
now play a major role in maintaining good relationship with markaz in
Indonesia (Kebun Jeruk), Malaysia (Sri Petaling), and India
(Nizamuddin).
C. Conclusion
The reason why Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh is well received in India, Southeast
Asia, and other parts of the world is because this movement provides
the Path by enhancing the spirit of mystical life over the fiqh. Insisting
mystical spirit over fiqh in a community where fiqh is controlled by
government or religious leaders is a serious challenge; and this is the
situation when the Tabli>ghist was coming. Jama’ah Tabli>gh offers the
guidelines to be in haqi>qa position by doing the mystical life without
neglecting the shari‘ah.
Thus, when Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh is questioned or banned, they did
not respond through the shari’a way that tends to be simplistic with
the use of  right or wrong perspective. The Jama>‘ah, in contrast, employed
a sympathetic way by increasing communication with those who
opposed them. It would be understandable when the members of
Jama’ah Tabli>gh give their ‘authority’ to government in administering
their mosque in Sri Petaling. I would argue that when a da‘wa movement,
including that of  Christianity, uses the strategy of  mystical life, they
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would be in good position. It is proven that in the history of the coming
of Islam to Nusantara, the Sufism play important role, but when ‘shari’a’
is formed or “politicized’ by the sharing power between the King and
the Ulama, Sufism was destroyed as happened in the case of Hamzah
Fansuri in Aceh. However, Jama’ah Tabli>gh is not against the ruler or
even challenges any suspicion of  deviant teaching. In this context they
had a strategy which is called the haqi>qa or the illuminative.
From the above perspective, it is clear that there are many factors
contributing to the emergence of  Jama>‘ah Tabligh. The sociopolitical
situation in India had led Mawlana Ilya>s to revive his society by returning
them the mode of life of the Prophet. Here, Mawlana did not
compromise with Hindu missionary and was convinced that Jama>‘ah
Tabli>gh was ‘an answer’ for the colonization and Hinduization. This
situation was similar to the emergence of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia
in response to the program of Christianization during the Dutch colonial
era. In this sense, Islamic movement tended to organize the society to
fight against colonialization. However, in the case of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh,
there are two types of responses to Hinduization; one type was
represented by Abu al-A‘la> al-Mawdu>di and another was by Mawlana
Ilya>s.
To respond Hinduization in India, Abu al-‘Ala> al-Mawdu>di
initiated the establishment of  Islamic party. In 1926, there were many
tensions in Indian sub-continent between Muslims and Hindus. This
was because of the failure of Ahimsa movement promoted by Mahatma
Gandhi, who accused Islam as ‘the religion of swords’. At the same
time, the khila>fat movement under Mawlana Muhammad ‘Ali utilized
the concept of jiha>d toward Hinduization. Mawdudi was one of
representatives of  the anti-Hinduization group, and he wrote many
issues on jiha>d in 1927.82 The result of his thought was his initiation to
establish an Islamic party, Jama‘at-i-Isla>mi>. Choueiri maintains that
Mawdudi idea is similar to that of  Sayyid Qutb. According to him, “in
its revivalist version, the exclusive sovereignty of  God served to combat
Sufi orders, saint worship and the intercession of human being on
–––––––––––––––––
82 See the Mawdudi’s understanding on jiha>d  in Choueiri, Youssef  M. Choueiri,
Islamic Fundamentalism, revised ed., (London and Washington: Pinter, 1997).
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behalf  of  believers.”83
The second type of Islamic fundamentalism is promoted by
Mawlana Ilya>s. To respond to the process of  converting Muslim to
Hindu by Hindu revivalist, Mawlana Ilya>s called Muslims to follow
sufi order. His experience with tari>qah shows that his movement seems
to mix three modes of Muslim life: sufism life, ‘islamic radicalism’,
and the prophet life. Mawlana Ilya>s’ links with Naqshabandiyyah is an
indication that his teaching was totally under the umbrella of the sufi
movement in India.  Historically, this sect was named after its founder,
Baha>’ al-Di>n Naqshaband (d. 1389). They are called as wali (saints) or
awliya>’ alla>h (the friends of Alla>h). However, they did not found the
tariqah, instead they only systemized the teachings and methods with
certain rituals and practices explicitly related to the founder of the
tari>qah.84 In other word, the Naqshabandiyyah is one way to worship
Alla>h under a method of  rituals conducted by the sufis.  According to
Van Bruinessen, this tari>qah came to India in 1592. Nevertheless, the
expansion of  sufism in India was not began in 17 century. It was,
according to Schimmel, ‘the full impat of Sufism began to be felt in
the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, after the consolidation
of  the main sufi orders in the central provinces of  Isla>m.’85 The sufi
order at this time was Chistiyyah which also influenced Mawlana Ilya>s.
Regarding this situation, Schimmel writes:
The most outstanding representative of this movement is Mu‘i>nuddin
Chisti>…The Chisti> order spread rapidly, and conversions in India during
that period were due mainly to the untiring activity of the Chisti> saints,
who simple and unsophisticated preaching and practive of love of
God and one’s neighbor impressed many Hindus, particularly those
from the lower castes, and even members of  the scheduled castes.86
–––––––––––––––––
83 Ibid., p. 124.
84 Martin van Bruinessen, Tarekat Nasyabandiah Di Indonesia, revised ed.,
(Bandung: Mizan, 1998), p. 48.
85 Annemari Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University
of  North Carolina, 1975), p. 345.
86 Ibid., p. 345.
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What I would like to emphasize here is that Mawlana Ilya>s
adopted many sufi teachings in his missionary. As I mentioned above,
he affiliated his name with the Chisti> and some of his teachings tend
to be similar to the Naqshabandi’s. The teachings of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
are part of  sufi teachings. For example, this movement utilizes the
concept of chilla, which is khuru>j fi sabi>lilla>h, outing from the community
for forty days. The movement also adopts the concept of  tawajjuh as a
close relationship between the master and muri >d (disciple) in
Naqshabandiyyah.87 In Jama‘ah Tabli>gh, this word is mentioned during
the baya>n. There is also the concept of jadhbah which is seen as one of
the ways of the spiritual master (mursyid or mura>d) in Sufi order to
understand and control the spiritual situation and level among his
muri>d.88  The real condition of  jadhbah is majdhu>b. About this concept,
Schimmel says:
…the Muslim mystics knew that there is another way of reaching higher
experiences: it is the jadzba, “attraction,” by which a person can be
exalted, in one spiritual experience, into a state of ecstasy and perfect
union. However, it seems typical that the name of  majdzu>b, “the attracted
one,” was usually given to people who were mentally deranged and
who were, in a sense, thrown out of  the way of  normal behavior by
overwhelming shock of an ‘unveilling’.89
Thus, it can be said that this movement uses the Sufi concept.
Even during my field work, there was no session to explain each concept
to member and saying this is part of any tariqah. Besides this, the name
of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh headquarter in India was named after the great sufi
in this country, Nizamuddin, a sufi master from the Chisti> order.
One of my argument that can be expanded in this study is that
Sufi’s aim to love God and ‘meet’ Him personally in khayya>li
(imagination) is also found in the teaching of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. It make
sense when Mawlana Ilya>s did not claim that he had establish a new
community. But, what makes him different from many Sufi orders, as
I mentioned above, is that his group is used to go outside (khuru>j) to
–––––––––––––––––
87 Ibid., p. 237; Pnina Werbner, Pilgrims of  Love: The Anthropology of  a Global Sufi
Cult (Indianapolis & Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2003), p. 173.
88 In’amuzzahidin Masyhudi, Wali-Sufi Gila (Yogyakarta: Ar-Ruzz, 2002), p. 37.
89 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of  Islam, p. 105.
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invite people to worship Alla>h in a mosque. Thus, the Tablighist has
own circle of the combination between mystical life and da‘wa. When
they relate these concepts, it can be argued that the Tablighist started
to adopt the Prophet life in their daily life.
It is widely acknowledged that Sufi order always connect their
genealogies to the Prophet of Muhammad. By doing this, in fact they
want to see how the Prophet spread his teaching to his people in his
life. Van Bruinessen argues that it is narrated that the Prophet of
Muhammad taught his Companion about the mystical ethnic according
to their life style, and it is believed that this is a good foundation to ask
why there are many spiritual paths among the tariqahs group.90 Thus,
many of Muslim pioneers has own interpretation and genealogies on
their ascetic life. For example, the great ‘ulama>’, according to some
author he tended to be called as founding father of Islamic radical,
Ima>m ibn Hanbal was as sufist in his daily life.91 Ibn Taymiyyah, who
always seen as the pioneer of  Wahabbism and attacked the traditional
practices of Sufi namely on wahdatul wuju>d (the unity of being), also
has a well written Sufi book entitled Al-Shu>fiyyah wa al-Fuqara (Sufist
and the Poor).92 The founding father of  Islamic modernism or Salafism,
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) wrote book on mystical life called
Risa>lat al-Wari>da>t (Treatise on Mystical Inspirations). He studied Sufi
from Syaikh Darwis al-Kha>di>r in Tanta. It is believed that he had been
a student of  the Sufi of  Ibn ‘Arabi, one of  the Sufi, from one of  his
teacher. It is interesting to sum up by quoting Scharbordt that:
Many Muslim reformers and Orientalist scholars attribute to Sufism
an inherent anti-modernism, blaming it for the intellectual stagnation
of the Muslim world because of its mystical obscurantism and its
contamination with non-Islamic innovations. The Sufism one encounters
in figures such as Afgha>ni and ‘Abduh is not anti-modern, backwards
and obscurantist but was, on the contrary, the driving force in facilitating
their intellectual engagement with the values of  Western modernity.
–––––––––––––––––
90 Bruinessen, Tarekat Nasyabandiah Di Indonesia, p. 48.
91 Ziaul Haque, “Ahmad Bin Hanbal: Profil Ulama-Sufi Baghdad”, Al-Hikmah:
Jurnal Studi-studi Islam, 5 (1992).
92 Th. E. Homerin, “Tentang Kitab ‘Al-Shufiyyah Wa Al-Fuqara” Karya Ibn
Taymiyyah”, Al-Hikmah: Jurnal Studi-Studi Islam, 12 (1994).
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Future research on the Sufi background of  Muslim reformers in modern
Islam might correct the image of an anti-modern Sufism by looking at
Sufi movements located on the margins, outside official Islam. Such
Sufi movement … might prove to have played a much greater role in
the modernization of Muslim societies and efforts of Muslim thinkers
to reconcile Islam with modernity…’93
Finally, I will highlight some important points of  this article.
First, the emergence of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh is a response to local Isla>m and
international Isla>m. By local Isla>m, I mean this movement is a challenge
to a process of Hinduization in India. Mawlana Ilya>s as a founder tries
to make Islam a contested religion in his society by combining two
methods: da‘wa and sufism. In international Islam, the founder goes by
gaining support to revive Muslim society as part of the issue of the
decline of Islamic caliphate. These efforts can be understood as keys
of  the process of  transnatiolization of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh. In addition,
this movement does not promote a new kind of re-interpretation of
Isla>m, but only focuses on the implementation of the Prophet and
sahabat spirits to Muslim society which blended into the mixing of
‘aqi>dah, shari>‘ah, and ma‘rifah. In this context, it is not a mistake to
argue that this movement has gained success in promoting Islam from
below.
Second, the process of  expansion of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Southeast
Asia tells us about the process of negotiating the identity and the
reconstruction of  Islam among Malays. This movement, colored by
South Asian cultures, has influenced the mode of Muslim culture in
Malaysia, a country with three major ethnic groups. As result, the
process of  the coming of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh indicates how Islamic-Indian
culture marries with Islam-Malaysian culture. After doing field work
and traveling in some states of  Malaysia, I would say that Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
has penetrated the new image of  Muslim in the country. Having national
and international (Asia Pacific) markaz, this movement has moved very
smoothly from da‘wa and sufism movement to a model of ‘a new
–––––––––––––––––
93 Oliver Scharbrodt, “The Salafiyya and Sufism: Muhammad ‘Abduh and His
Risa>lat Al-Wa>rida>t (Treatise of  Mystical Inspirations)”, Bulletion of  SOAS, 70,1 (2007),
pp. 114-115.
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government’ in Malaysia. Their members come not only from low class,
but also from middle class. It tells us about the succes of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
in establishing an ‘Islamic state’ in the state.
Third, the process of  the coming of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh in Aceh gives
us a different picture of the conflict of authority and charisma among
traditional Isla>m. Jama>‘ah Tabligh as product of  ‘local’ and ‘international
Islam’ from South Asia does not succeed in meeting with Islam in
Aceh which is produced by traditional ‘ulama in dayah (Islamic boarding
school). Thus, the early conflict between this movement and traditional
‘ulama is the conflict of authority and charisma. When this movement
penetrated the province, many of ‘special jobs’ for traditional ‘ulama>’
lost,94 because the member of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh do not pay attention on
the hierarchy in their da‘wa activity to society. That is why many of
traditional ‘ulama>’ did not receive this movement as ‘Acehnese-local-
Islam.’ Until today in the area where it has been controlled by local
‘ulama, it is not easy for the movement to do their da‘wa activity. Their
resistance againts the movement is not a political issue as what
happened in Sabah and Melacca of Malaysia. In Aceh, people tend to
see this movement as deviant teaching. Thus, I could say that the process
of  recruiting of  membership seems to focus among urban people and
middle class. This study shows how the early history of  Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh
is not a product of religion from ‘ulama>’, but rather from young
intellectual Isla>m who see that the Tablighist life style is a ‘middle
eastern Islam.’
Fourth, I would argue that in anthropological studies, there is a
tension between a religion as local product and international product.
Here, in the case of Islam, even they have the same teaching, there is
still conflict among the religious followers in term of  religious practices.
–––––––––––––––––
94 In Acehnese society, traditional ‘ulama play major role in many aspect of  social
life which sometimes relates to their income such as slametan, weekly pengajian, funeral
activity, reading al-Qur’an in cemetery, as leader for many kenduri activities. Mostly from
these activities, the traditional ‘ulama would get pay. This is not including their job as
special advisor from political parties, armies, bupati, and people who need their spiritual
power. Thus, in Aceh traditional ulama can be called as the guardian of  society. See M.
Hasbi Amiruddin, Ulama Dayah: Pengawal Agama Masyarakat Aceh, trans. Kamaruzzaman
Bustamam-Ahmad (Lhokseumawe: Nadya Foundation, 2003).
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In the case of Aceh, many argue that Islam in Aceh comes from Gujarat
(India), but the coming of  ‘Islam as product’ through Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh is
not ‘real Islam’ as they understood from traditional ‘ulama>. This contest
has lead to a conflict among the people who join this movement and
the people who maintain their ‘religious interpretation’ from local
‘ulama. The case of Malaysia indicates that Islam as South Asian
product has been successful because there is a link between the history
of Indian people in the country and the original aims of the coming of
Jama>‘ah Tabli>gh to Malaysia which is to unify Indian-Muslims. However,
Malay-Muslims view that this style as a different Muslim life style which
can be seen in the early history of Malaysia.
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